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It is now well established that the time course of perceptual processing influences the
first second or so of performance in a wide variety of cognitive tasks. Over the last
20 years, there has been a shift frommodeling the speed at which a display is processed, to
modeling the speed at which different features of the display are perceived and formalizing
how this perceptual information is used in decision making. The first of these models
(Lamberts, 1995) was implemented to fit the time course of performance in a speeded
perceptual categorization task and assumed a simple stochastic accumulation of feature
information. Subsequently, similar approaches have been used to model performance
in a range of cognitive tasks including identification, absolute identification, perceptual
matching, recognition, visual search, and word processing, again assuming a simple
stochastic accumulation of feature information from both the stimulus and representations
held in memory. These models are typically fit to data from signal-to-respond experiments
whereby the effects of stimulus exposure duration on performance are examined, but
response times (RTs) and RT distributions have also been modeled. In this article, we
review this approach and explore the insights it has provided about the interplay between
perceptual processing, memory retrieval, and decision making in a variety of tasks. In
so doing, we highlight how such approaches can continue to usefully contribute to our
understanding of cognition.
Keywords: information accumulation, perception, memory, cognition, categorization, identification, visual search,
reading
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of evidence, using detailed mathematical models
of the time course of perception and memory, clearly demon-
strates that information about a stimulus in the environment
and about memory representations becomes gradually available
over time (e.g., Purcell et al., 2010). Over the last 20 years mod-
els of perceptual information accumulation have begun to be
integrated within formal models of cognitive processes based on
the principle that, in everyday life, we frequently have to make
very quick decisions about what objects are and what properties
they have (e.g., Lamberts, 2002). For example, in the laboratory
it might take 1,000 ms to categorize a stimulus correctly. This
time will partly be determined by the time to make a decision
and the time to produce a response, but a significant propor-
tion of the time will involve perceptual processing, i.e., the time
taken to accumulate object information and form a representa-
tion of the object. In everyday life, we might have much less
time to make a decision considering that we make 3–4 fixations
per second in a dynamic visual scene that changes as we move
through it. This means that we often make decisions based on
incomplete perceptual information, either because the amount of
perceptual processing time is limited or because of environmen-
tal conditions such as occlusion or poor lighting. Similarly, many
cognitive tasks require the reconstruction, from memory, of past
stimuli, and there may be insufficient time for this reconstruc-
tive retrieval process to be completed. It is therefore important to
understand how stimulus information is accumulated from both
perception andmemory, integrated and utilized in cognitive tasks,
and the extent to which errors in such tasks can be attributable to
making decisions based on incomplete perceptual and memorial
representations.
In this article we argue that stochastic sampling of feature infor-
mation is a process common to both perception and memory and
that it underlies early performance in a number of tasks includ-
ing categorization and identification, recognition and matching,
visual search, and word identification. Our literature review cen-
ters on the development of a stochastic feature sampling process
first instantiated in a model by Lamberts (1995). While this
focus means our review is not exhaustive, it allows us to pro-
vide a comprehensive account of one of the most broadly applied
approaches to integrating a formalized feature sampling mech-
anism with models of cognition. We show that by embodying
relatively simple central concepts the model can help us explore
the similarities and difference across tasks, which other, more
specific, approaches may miss. We end with some thoughts on
the future directions for the field and the inclusion of stochastic
sampling processes in models of memory and perception more
broadly.
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STOCHASTIC INFORMATION ACCUMULATION
Our approach to modeling the time course of perception and
retrieval relies on the process of sampling information elements
from either a physical stimulus or a memorial representation
of a previous stimulus. We do not attempt a complete history
of the field here, but instead note that current ideas about the
nature of stimulus perception can be traced most fully back to
the seminal Psychological Review article by Estes (1950) and his
statistical theory of learning. Not only did stimulus sampling
theory kick-start a major shift toward the development of for-
mal mathematical models of learning and memory (e.g., LaBerge,
1959; Bower, 1967; McGill, 1967; Norman and Rumelhart, 1970;
Rumelhart, 1970; Wolford, 1975; amongst many others), but it
highlighted the importance of variability in stimulus perception
and the stochastic nature of stimulus sampling (see Bower, 1994,
for a review of the impact of Estes, 1950). According to the stim-
ulus sampling process (see Estes and Burke, 1953, for a detailed
account), a stimulus consists of a finite population of small inde-
pendent elements that are sampled randomly. Because the process
is stochastic, the number of sampled elements varies between
presentations. The currently perceived stimulus is therefore the
average number of elements sampled within the duration of pre-
sentation. Each element is associated, through learning, with a
response, such that element sampling gradually builds up evidence
for one response over other responses. This simple conception
has had a dramatic impact on the field of cognitive psychology
(see Bower, 1994, and the two volumes edited by Healy et al.,
1992a,b) and continues to inspire models of perception andmem-
ory. For example, sequential sampling models often include the
assumption that the decision process is driven by perceptual sam-
pling, e.g., see, Townsend and Ashby, 1983; Luce, 1986; Usher and
McClelland, 2001; Brown andHeathcote, 2005; Purcell et al., 2010,
for reviews). An alternative to the popular sequential sampling
models is to assume participants continue accumulating infor-
mation until they have sufficient evidence for one response over
another, based on the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1963), this is the
option we adopt, as it allows a detailed examination of the time
course of object-feature information accumulation (Lamberts,
2000).
Estes’s conception of stochastic sampling of elements is still
at the heart of the theoretical approach of the core models we
review here. However, the exact meaning of an element is some-
what different from one where elements might represent whole
items (e.g., letters or digits) but instead refers to subcomponents
of a stimulus feature (e.g., Bower, 1967; Rumelhart, 1970). It is
therefore important to outline explicitly what we mean by an ele-
ment. An element is a hypothetical construct relating to a basic
unit of information about a stimulus. Features are composed
of a number of non-differentiated elements. For mathematical
tractability, it can often be assumed that a single element (for
binary valued dimensions) or a small number of elements (for
continuously valued dimensions) are available for sampling with-
out a great loss of precision. Elements are sampled from a sensory
store in order to establish a stimulus representation in (for exam-
ple) visual short term memory (VSTM) upon which a perceptual
decision can be made. This conception is common to many other
current models (see Purcell et al., 2010, for a discussion of the
different types). Critically, however, the approach we take models
accumulation of individual object features, whereas most other
models focus on the stimulus as a whole. Thus the model is able
to account for how an incomplete stimulus representation drives
perceptual decisions. Sampling of elements is: random without
replacement; discrete, in that partial information about an ele-
ment cannot exist; and the probability of sampling one element
is independent of sampling any other element. These properties
result in a Poisson process, the time between events in a Pois-
son process is described by an exponential distribution. Thus the
cumulative probability of a feature x being included at or before
time t is
ix(t) = λ
[
1 − e−βx(t−δ)
]
in which λ is the asymptotic probability of a feature being
included (which may be less than 1 for noisy stimuli or weakly
encoded representations), β is the rate at which the informa-
tion is sampled about that feature, and δ is any non-processing
time (e.g., decision and motor response times). This simple
equation can be used to model the information accumulation
process for each feature from both an external stimulus, and
from memory. Different tasks will require different decision
rules, but the strong argument which we attempt to demon-
strate in the following literature review is that the general form
of the information accumulation process remains fixed across
tasks.
ESTIMATING ACCUMULATED INFORMATION
Although the notion of stochastic information accumulation is
employed in many models, directly estimating the amount of
information accumulated and utilized in a cognitive task is dif-
ficult. Many experiments on early stimulus perception involved
(and continue to involve) presenting a stimulus for a brief period
and thenmeasuring the time to respond (RT). Although useful for
many purposes, using RTs as a dependent measure, however, can
confound processing time (forcing a quick response) with the time
of stimulus exposure (brief stimulus durations;Wickelgren, 1977).
A problem arises because participants are able to trade accuracy
for speed. Participants may choose to respond to a briefly pre-
sented stimulus quickly but sacrifice accuracy, or take more time
to reach a higher level of accuracy. This speed accuracy trade-off
(SAT) means that differences in accuracy at short lags, or differ-
ences in RTs at longer lags may represent strategic shifts by the
participants. Wickelgren (1977, see also Pachella, 1974; Wickel-
gren, 1975; Dosher, 1976, 1979) strongly argued against the use
of only RT data from free-RT experiments to test models about
the dynamics of cognition. This is especially true when error rates
are very low as these are the conditions in which large variations
in RTs may be seen for very small changes in accuracy between
conditions (which might not be observable with even large sam-
ple sizes), which is typically where free-RTs are most often used.
A single mean RT is therefore not very helpful in evaluating the-
ories about the time course of information accumulation. Models
need to predict both accuracy and RTs for various levels of per-
formance, since a given RT could be achieved by a participant
setting a certain level of accuracy. Control of the SAT therefore
needs to be taken away from the participants and built into the
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experimental design. Means of achieving such control focus on
the idea of a signal-to-respond (STR) paradigm in which partici-
pants are cued to respond after different intervals after the onset
of a stimulus. Examining performance at very short signal lags
through to longer signal lags enables a picture of the time course
of performance to be built up that can be used to estimate how
information is accumulated.
Reed (1973, 1976) used the offset of the stimulus to cue when to
respond andmixed response signal conditions within block so that
participants would not know ahead of the signal how much time
they would have to respond, reducing the possibility of strategic
control (although seeHeit et al., 2003, 2008, who demonstrate that
participants can shift their strategic responding even under STR
conditions). A further refinement of the method was proposed
by Meyer et al. (1988) who argued that tasks involving only short
signal trials meant that participants may employ a completely dif-
ferent strategy to the one they would adopt under free-RT. They
proposed that free-RT trials should also be included in the mix of
signal trials, and outlined a detailed method (the titrated reaction
time procedure) and analysis for speed-accuracy decomposition.
With these concerns in mind, modern application of the STR
procedure typically includes a number of longer response times
to ensure “normal” strategic processing is used. However, the
decomposition technique suggested by Meyer et al. (1988) is most
relevant to situations in which accuracy growsmonotonically over
the time course of a trial. As the literature review will make clear,
this is not always the case, and non-monotonic SAT curves are
particularly informative about the piecemeal nature of stimulus
processing.
MODELING SAT CURVES
Modeling SAT curves yields useful information about the pro-
cessing dynamics of a task. There are two broad approaches in
modeling these SAT curves. In one approach, the one we refer to
above, an assumption about information accumulation about a
stimulus or its features is built in to a process model of the cog-
nitive task, that is, a model that indicates how this information is
utilized within that given task. An example of this is perceptual
categorization, whereby a participant accumulates information
about the stimulus, building up a stimulus representation that
is then used to determine which category the stimulus belongs
to. Information accumulation thus has to be integrated with a
model about exactly how that perceptual information is used to
make a decision. An alternative approach is to focus only on the
dynamics of information accumulation and to examine how these
differ between experimental conditions or between participants.
In this approach, the SAT curve is produced for a given condi-
tion, and then a shifted exponential rise to asymptote function is
fit to this curve (empirically the exponential function fits well).
The exponential function is similar to that in the equation above,
except that this does not refer to the probability of feature inclu-
sion, but a measure of task performance. This form of the STR
method and analysis has been influential and is important in sev-
eral respects. First, it has been used widely throughout cognitive
psychology in order to explore the time course of information
accumulation estimates from the processing dynamics of different
tasks. Second, the models of cognition that this review focuses on
have utilized this formalization of information accumulation and
integrated it within models describing cognitive tasks. Third, the
strongest tests of these models necessarily come from experiments
using the STR methodology, as these provide critical information
about object-feature accumulation. We now consider how this
simple formulation of information accumulation, which has pro-
vided the core processing assumption of various related models,
is useful in comparing the similarities between several important
cognitive tasks.
IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION
In many categorization studies, the participant’s job is to learn
to associate n stimuli with m response options (m < n). The n
stimuli are typically composed of a number of either binary or
continuously valued feature dimensions. Identification is a special
case of categorization in which n = m. Absolute identification
is a special case of identification in which stimuli vary along
only a single dimension (e.g., loudness or brightness). Because
of these simple relationships, it is likely that the three tasks involve
the same underlying processes and only minimal adjustments to
the decision rules should be necessary for a model of one task
to generalize to the other tasks. Although multiple models of
these tasks have been developed, we focus in one in particu-
lar, the extended generalized context model (EGCM; Lamberts,
1995, 1998, 2000) that highlights the role of a perceptual informa-
tion accumulation process in determining performance in these
tasks.
The EGCM is a development of the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986)
in which a decision to categorize a stimulus into one category or
another is based on the summed similarity of that stimulus to
the stored members (exemplars) of each of the categories (using
the Luce, 1963, choice ratio). Stimuli are represented as points in a
psychological space, the dimensions of which correspond to differ-
ent features. Similarity between stimuli is a decreasing function –
the generalization gradient – of their distance in this psycholog-
ical space (Shepard, 1957). Of central importance to the GCM
is that this psychological space is malleable. A dimension can be
weighted more strongly if it is important for successful catego-
rization such that distances along this dimension in psychological
space are stretched. This utility weighting is limited in capacity
such that increasing the utility weight allocated to one dimension
decreases the utility of another. This acts to stretch and shrink the
psychological space thusmaking similaritymore or less dependent
on different dimensions.
Using a categorization task in which a stimulus was presented
for different durations and then had to be categorized (partici-
pants had already been trained to categorize a subset of stimuli)
Lamberts (1995) fit the GCM to categorization performance at
the different durations and showed that with increasing time to
process the stimuli the generalization gradient for categorization
becomes steeper and the utility weight distribution changes. That
is, the differences between a stimulus and exemplars in memory
had a larger impact on categorization with more time to process
stimuli. This led Lamberts (1995) to suggest a role for perceptual
processing in categorization whereby, early on, when process-
ing time is short, limited information about stimulus features is
available from which to make category decisions (the stimulus is
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undifferentiated along the different dimensions), whereas later on
category decisions are based on more complete representation of
the stimulus. Importantly, changes in categorization performance
over time can be explained by differences in the rate at which
stimulus dimensions are processed. For example, if color is pro-
cessed faster than shape, then categorization decisions in which
color information is critical will be accurate earlier than catego-
rization decisions for which shape information is critical. These
principles were formalized in the EGCM, in which the similar-
ity between a presented stimulus and stored exemplars (and thus
categorization performance) is determined by whether or not per-
ceptual information about each stimulus dimension is available.
The formalization of information accumulation is similar to that
already given above, with the rate at which perceptual information
about a dimension is accumulated thought to reflect the percep-
tual salience of the stimulus dimension (we return to this issue
later).
The validity of the EGCM has been extensively tested by show-
ing it can provide a good fit to data on the time course of
performance in a variety categorization tasks in which partici-
pants have to learn to categorize a set of stimuli comprised of
a number of different dimensions (e.g., line drawings of faces
comprised of different mouths, noses, and eyes) and later have
to categorize these (and new) stimuli under time pressure (Lam-
berts, 1995, 1998; Lamberts and Brockdorff, 1997; Lamberts and
Freeman, 1999a,b). Of particular importance, Lamberts and Free-
man (1999a) clearly demonstrated the importance of perceptual
processes in accounting for categorization performance. In one
task Lamberts and Freeman (1999a) trained people to categorize
objects. Later they asked participants to categorize incomplete
objects (where one or more features had been removed). Finally,
participants categorized complete objects again, but under time
pressure. Lamberts and Freeman (1999a) reasoned that if the
EGCM is correct and object representations are built gradu-
ally from stochastically sampled features, then they should see
a systematic correspondence in category choice early on in pro-
cessing whole objects under time pressure and part-stimuli under
free-RT. Across two experiments the pattern of categorization of
part-stimuli closely matched that of whole stimuli categorized at
short durations providing strong support for the feature sampling
mechanism.
In a second task, Lamberts and Freeman (1999a) used a cate-
gory structure in which one stimulus in Category A shared many
features of stimuli in Category B. They showed that, under limited
time pressure, this stimulus tended to be incorrectly categorized
early on in processing before being categorized accurately at longer
stimulus durations. This category cross over effect is important
because other models that do not utilize a feature based percep-
tual processing component struggle to account for it. That is, if
a model assumes similarity is static and time invariant, then it is
difficult for it to predict anything other than amonotonic increase
from chance level performance with increases in time for catego-
rization. The EGCM can account for this because fast processing
of a feature commonly associated with one category will make
the stimulus seem more similar to that category when time for
processing is short and limited information about other stimulus
dimensions is available.
This development and testing of the EGCM indicated the
importance of perceptual processing mechanisms in determining
performance in categorization and showed how a feature based
perceptual processing component could be integrated into a for-
mal model of categorization. Subsequently, this led to another
key model of categorization, the exemplar based random walk
model (EBRW; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997) being extended to
incorporate a perceptual processing component so that it could
account for the time course of categorization of stimuli with
separable-dimensions (Cohen and Nosofsky, 2003).
Given the importance of perceptual processing in categoriza-
tion, a key question is what determines the rate that a stimulus
dimension is processed. Lamberts (1995, 1998) suggested that
processing rates were independent of the utility of the dimen-
sion (how important a dimension is for correct categorization)
and in several experiments demonstrated that perceptual pro-
cessing rates were determined largely by perceptual salience of
the dimension and not dimension utility (changing the category
structure had little effect on processing rates; see also Ashby and
Maddox,1994;Maddox andBogdanov,2000;Maddox,2001;Mad-
dox and Dodd, 2003). However, given that visual attention is
known to modulate sensory processing (e.g., Luck et al., 1994;
Treue, 2001; Carrasco et al., 2002), accelerate the rate of per-
ceptual processing (Carrasco and McElree, 2001), and can be
flexibly allocated (Bundesen, 1990), Guest and Lamberts (2010)
re-examined conditions under which knowledge of the category
structure can influence perceptual processing rates. Their experi-
ments used a categorization task in which all stimulus dimensions
needed to be processed in order to ensure correct categorization
but where stimulus dimensions clearly differed in their diagnos-
ticity (how diagnostic they were of category membership) and
diagnosticity was pitted against the perceptual salience of stim-
ulus dimensions. Under these conditions, Guest and Lamberts
(2010) found evidence for prioritization of perceptual processing:
diagnosticity accelerated the rate of feature information accu-
mulation. This finding raises questions about the nature of the
mechanism responsible for prioritization including whether there
might be multiple systems for controlling utility weighting and
prioritization.
One of the central assumptions of the feature sampling model
encapsulated in the EGCM is that feature information is continu-
ally combined and integrated into a percept that is used to access
memory. Recent research on rule based categorization has shown
that this is not necessarily the case. Fific et al. (2010) examined
how processing of different dimensions of a stimulus proceeds
when a category set can be defined by a set of rules. In these stud-
ies, a category set is defined by two features that can either be
spatially separable (as is typical of the types of stimuli to which
the EGCM has been applied) or integral (e.g., colors varying in
brightness and saturation). Fific et al. (2010) examined whether
independent logical rules (such as those employed by decision
bound theory, e.g., Ashby and Townsend, 1986; Maddox and
Ashby, 1993) for each feature (is feature X larger than a crite-
rion, is feature Y larger than a criterion) are used sequentially or
in parallel or whether evidence from both features was combined
in order to make a coactive category judgment (as in the EBRW).
They found evidence for mostly serial processing of dimensions
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when the features were spatially separable, a mix of sequential
and parallel processing when the features were separable but spa-
tially overlaid (Little et al., 2010), and coactive processing when
stimuli were integral (Little et al., 2013). Thus, in contrast to the
feature sampling principles of the EGCM, coactive integration of
feature information was not apparent using stimuli with separable
dimensions. However, the models tested by Fific et al. (2010) did
not include the EGCM, which likely falls somewhere in between
the models tested. It is likely that the EGCM will not easily mimic
the serial use of decision rules observed by Fific et al. (2010) and so
some modification to the current model in situations where serial
processing is encouraged is likely. For example, the introduction
of variable takeoff times (currently included as constants in the
residual time parameter) for information accumulation along the
different dimensions, or the inclusion of a different decision rule,
which encapsulates serial feature comparison between the per-
ceptual information and stored information (either exemplars of
decision criteria),may allow theEGCMtoaccount for the apparent
serial use of feature information when evaluating rules. Neither of
these changes affect the nature of the stochastic sampling process.
In addition, we note that during other tasks, such as visual search,
there is evidence that overlaid features are combined to form per-
cepts of display objects (Takeda et al., 2007) rather than search
proceeding based on independent feature comparisons (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980). Thus serial, parallel or coactive processing may
depend on task demands.
In light of Fific et al.’s (2010) findings, it is instructive at this
stage to consider what processing rates themselves might reflect
(we thank a reviewer for this suggestion). Differential feature pro-
cessing rates might, in some cases, be the result of preferential
serial processing of that information. Thus prioritization of fea-
ture processing (Guest and Lamberts, 2010) may be the result
of a serial processing strategy developed in category learning
and based on feature diagnosticity. Indeed, Rehder and Hoff-
man (2005) demonstrated a clear association between attention
weights in categorization models and eye fixations on features.
Such a conceptualization offers feature sampling models multiple
mechanisms for accounting for andmodeling the effects of feature
salience and feature validity which are well known to tradeoff (e.g.,
see Kruschke and Johansen, 1999).
An important development of the EGCM is the EGCM-RT
(Lamberts, 2000) which accounts for RTs in free-RT tasks. The
EGCM-RT explicitly states that as perceptual information is pro-
cessed, information elements (subcomponents of features) are
sampled (not just whole features). This allows themodel to predict
a gradual increase in information about a feature. As each element
is sampled, the evidence for the different categories is evaluated,
based on summed similarity. A decision to either stop percep-
tual processing and produce a response, or to continue to sample
information is made based on whether there is clear evidence for
one response over other responses (determined partly by a free
parameter controlling how deterministic responding is, similar to
a threshold value in sequential sampling models of choice). The
EGCM-RT provided a good account for accuracy, mean RT, and
the time course data in a variety of categorization tasks, using
both separable and integral-dimension stimuli (Lamberts, 2000).
Due to the proportional hazards model for feature inclusion and
the tight coupling of the stopping rule with accuracy, the EGCM-
RT also naturally accounts for RT differences holding across the
distribution (i.e, in cumulative distributions, see Maddox et al.,
1998).
Kent and Lamberts (2005) subsequently applied the EGCM-RT
to absolute identification. Absolute identification has a long his-
tory (e.g., Miller, 1956; see Brown et al., 2008, for a review) and
as such there are several effects that any model needs to account
for. Many models have been suggested (see Stewart et al., 2005, for
a review) but only a handful have attempted to account for RTs
as well as accuracy. Surprisingly, given the fundamental nature
of processes involved in absolute identification, and its continued
interest, little consideration had been given to the relation between
perceptual processing and performance in absolute identification
until the application of the EGCM-RT by Kent and Lamberts
(2005). They demonstrated that not only could the EGCM-RT
account for the bow effect (response are more accurate and faster
for stimuli located at the ends of the range) and set-seize effects
(larger set-sizes are less accurately and more slowly responded to
than smaller set sizes) it was also able to provide a good account
theRTdistributions. This extension of the EGCM-RT thus showed
that the principles of perceptual information accumulation could
be integrated not only into formal models of categorization, but
also identification (Kent, 2006, also successfully applied the model
to multi-dimensional identification in his unpublished doctoral
thesis).
Recently, however, Guest et al. (2010) questioned the sig-
nificance of the role of perceptual processing in determining
free-RT in absolute identification. Nosofsky (1983) reported
that stimulus repetitions within a trial in an absolute identifi-
cation task increased discriminability. Convinced that this was
due to increased opportunity for perceptual processing, Guest
et al. (2010) completed a variety of experiments designed to
determine the underlying cause. To their surprise, the cause
was not increased opportunity for perceptual processing, but
seemed to be because of increased trial length; forcing partic-
ipants to respond more slowly by presenting an item multiple
times improved performance because it provided more time for
response processes to complete. This finding led to a reassess-
ment of the extent of perceptual accumulation processing in the
EGCM-RT.
In a recent set of absolute identification tasks, Guest et al.
(manuscript in preparation) tried to further elucidate the respec-
tive roles of perception, memory, and decision making in absolute
identification. Guest et al. (manuscript in preparation) manip-
ulated stimulus exposure duration and found that accuracy
increased over exposure duration suggesting gradual information
accumulation. However, even at very short stimulus exposures
(which offer little time for perceptual processing) it was observed
that stimuli near the center of the range were responded to slower
than stimuli at the end of the range (the bow effect). Criti-
cally, the EGCM normally accounts for an RT bow effect by
assuming that for stimuli in the center of the range, respond-
ing is less certain (because stimuli have more neighbors and are
therefore more confusable) and so more information must be
accumulated (resulting in longer RTs). Of course, this is not pos-
sible if the stimulus has offset (backward masking was used).
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To model this finding Guest et al. (manuscript in preparation)
assumed that the stimulus sampling mechanism of the EGCM-
RT operates in two domains, perceptual processing, which is
relatively rapid and drives accuracy, and memory processing,
which is relatively slow and drives RTs. Such a model provided a
good account for this data. Furthermore, it suggests that future
work should focus on disentangling the perceptual and mem-
ory sampling processes in other tasks. Our belief is that some
tasks involve larger stimulus sampling demands than others. In
particular, where the memory representation is weaker, the mem-
ory retrieval process is a more significant contributor to RTs
than perceptual processing. Nonetheless, it is clear from this
work that both information sampling in perception and from
memory should be integrated into models of categorization and
identification.
MATCHING AND RECOGNITION
Perhaps the most direct evidence for stochastic sampling of infor-
mation from stored stimulus representation comes from work
on recognition memory. Studies of recognition memory were
among the first to benefit from the use of STR methods (e.g.,
Reed, 1973). Reed (1976) demonstrated that the set size of a list
of consonants affected the rate of information retrieval, with a
slower rate of retrieval for larger set sizes. Further analysis by
McElree and Dosher (1989) on Reed’s (1976) data suggested that
the asymptote varied with set size, with smaller set sizes having
higher asymptotes. Experiments by McElree and Dosher (1989)
also demonstrated that, whilst there was a serial position effect
for asymptotic performance and a set size effect on asymptote,
the only difference in retrieval dynamics was a faster retrieval rate
for items in the last serial position (see also Dosher, 1981). Thus
information about items held in memory is clearly retrieved over
an extended time period, and the rate at which information can
be retrieved is a function of the recency of encoding (a single final
item advantage might suggest the item is still held in a relatively
accessible state).
Hintzman and Curran (1994) used the STR technique to exam-
ine the relationship between judgments of frequency (“How often
did this item occur in the study list?”) and old-new recognition.
HintzmanandCurran (1994) found that both tasks showed similar
information accumulation dynamics, concluding they were driven
by a common familiarity process. In two further experiments
Hintzman and Curran (1994) looked at the retrieval dynamics
of words that were Old, New, and Similar-New (the plural of a sin-
gular old word, or vice versa). Hintzman andCurran (1994) found
that the false alarm rate (saying “old” to a Similar-New item) ini-
tially rose at short signal lags, and then decreased at longer lags.
They tooknon-monotonicity as evidence that, early on in retrieval,
a familiarity signal cannot distinguish between Old and Similar-
New items, and it is not until a slower recall process (needed to
extract the grammatical number of the item) has completed that
the Similar-New items can be correctly rejected. However, this
dual-process interpretationmight not be warranted. If retrieval of
(episodic) information linking a specific item to a given context is
slower than recall of item information, then the non-monotonicity
in Hintzman and Curran’s (1994) data need not be down to sep-
arate processes, but instead be the result of different retrieval
dynamics for different features of the stored stimulus. Indeed,
studies have consistently shown that item information is retrieved
faster than associative information (e.g., Gronlund and Ratcliff,
1989; Rotello andHeit, 2000) andposition information (Gronlund
et al., 1997; see Schneider and Anderson, 2012, for a review).
Brockdorff and Lamberts (2000) developed the feature-
sampling theory of recognition (FESTHER) from theEGCMbased
on the principle that there is considerable overlap between cate-
gorization and recognition: recognition requires a decision as to
whether an item belongs to one category (“old”) or another cate-
gory (“new”) based on the similarity to stored exemplars in each
category (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988, 1991; Estes, 1994; see Nosofsky
et al., 2011, for a recent extension of the ERBW to short-term
memory scanning). For Old items it is easy to calculate simi-
larity as the set of studied items is known. However, for New
items it is unclear which stored exemplars constitute the rele-
vant comparison group (whether it is all stored exemplars or a
subset) and so typically it is assumed that all stored items are
used (Estes, 1994; Nosofsky, 1988, 1991). Information is accumu-
lated by element sampling until enough information is available
to categorize the stimulus as “old” or “new” based on relative sim-
ilarity or until a response signal is encountered. Thus the model
is formally equivalent to the EGCM for categorization except that
the stimulus is compared with the studied items and all stored
items.
Brockdorff and Lamberts (2000) applied FESTHER to the data
from Hintzman and Curran’s (1994) experiment, which demon-
strated the non-monotonic SAT functions for Similar-New items
(presented either once or twice at study) and to new data. The
initial increase in false alarms was taken as evidence by Hintz-
man and Curran (1994) as responding due to familiarity and the
decrease at longer lags as evidence for an increased use of recall-
to-reject. FESTHER, however, predicted the non-monotonicity
without the need to include two processes. Instead, according to
FESTHER, the initial increase in false alarms for similar items is
due to the incomplete stimulus representation leading to a high
similarity between Old and Similar-New items. As time increases
more features are sampled and the likelihood of sampling the crit-
ical feature is increased, resulting in a reduction of false alarms at
longer lags (see alsoRotello andHeit, 1999). In addition, by assum-
ing the strength in memory of twice-presented Old items is higher
than once-presented Old items, FESTHER was able to correctly
predict the frequency effect and the tendency for twice-present
Similar-New items to have higher false alarms than once-presented
Similar-New items at short signals lags.
Brockdorff and Lamberts (2000) further tested the feature sam-
pling account by examining the time course of recognition for
individual items in three experiments, by creating a tightly con-
trolled stimulus set (visual objects consisting of 3 or 4 binary
valued dimensions). In a study phase a subset of items were shown
and participants made feature recognition judgments. At test par-
ticipants were shown both the original study items (Old) and
the unseen items (New). Although this task differs from tradi-
tional old-new recognition tasks in that only a limited number
of stimuli were used and extensive exposure to each study item
stimulus was provided, this afforded the advantage that a detailed
analysis of the time course of feature information accumulation
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could be conducted. FESTHER was able to account for the time
course differences between individual items by allowing the per-
ceptual processing rates to vary by feature. Early false alarms for
some items were driven by salient dimensions which were pro-
cessed quickly and made New items perceptually similar to Old
items while an increase in false alarms for other items later in
processing was caused by feature information that was processed
slowermaking theNew itemsmore similar toOld items. Thus FES-
THER represents an important challenge to dual process models
(although see Göthe and Oberauer, 2008 andMalmberg, 2008, for
alternative dual process accounts) butmore importantly highlights
why it is necessary to consider how perceptual information is pro-
cessed over the initial stages of recognition in any, single or dual
process, model of recognition (e.g., Malmberg, 2008; Schneider
and Anderson, 2012).
Although considering perceptual processing is important,
clearly there are many other processes operating in cognitive
tasks such as recognition. Lamberts et al. (2003) therefore com-
pared the predictions from FESTHER with those from the EBRW
when fitting recognition RTs and accuracy for individual stimuli.
Both models contained the same assumption regarding comput-
ing similarity to all stored exemplars for New items) as both are
based on the GCM model of categorization and recognition, e.g.,
Nosofsky, 1986, 1988). The models differ in the assumed pro-
cess responsible for differences in choice patterns and RTs with
FESTHER focusing of perceptual processing and the EBRW on
the time course of retrieval (sampling from memory) and deci-
sion making (instantiated by a random walk process). In three
free-RT old-new recognition experiments, Lamberts et al. (2003)
found the EBRW provided a superior fit to individual stimuli
than FESTHER suggesting that in free-RT recognition (although
not STR recognition, Brockdorff and Lamberts, 2000) memory
sampling and decision making drive a large part of the differ-
ences in RTs (see also Ratcliff, 1978; Hockley and Murdock,
1987; Diller et al., 2001; Nosofsky et al., 2011; Schneider and
Anderson, 2012, for models which ascribe memory and decision
making processes as driving RT in recognition). This may par-
ticularly be true when memory traces are weak (as in Lamberts
et al., 2003) and need effortful retrieval, but not when stimuli
are well learnt (as in Brockdorff and Lamberts, 2000, and in
categorization experiments, Lamberts, 2000, 2002). Therefore,
the speed at which sampling from memory can be achieved is
likely to be a function of practice in a similar way that pre-
sentation frequency affects retrieval rates (e.g., Hintzman and
Curran, 1994; Brockdorff and Lamberts, 2000) and associative fan
(the number of items a cue is associated with) reduces retrieval
speed (Schneider and Anderson, 2012). When stimuli are well
learnt, and strongly represented in memory, their retrieval times
will account for less of the effect on RTs compared with stim-
uli that have only been seen once or are weakly represented in
memory.
In light of the importance of the joint impact of perceptual
feature sampling and memory feature sampling in recognition,
Lamberts et al. (2002) conducted a set of experiments to examine
both processes. They used a variety of simultaneousmatching (two
stimuli were presented at the same time) and sequential matching
(one stimuluswas shownfirst and remainedonscreen as the second
stimulus was presented) to gain estimates of perceptual processing
speeds for the feature on which the stimuli differed. They then
used a delayed sequential matching task (analogous to a single
item old–new recognition task as there was a 5 s gap between
presentation of the first and second stimulus) to examine the rate
of feature retrieval. Lamberts et al. (2002) fit data from these tasks
using simple feature sampling models for both the perception of
features (data from simultaneous and sequential matching tasks)
and the joint perception and retrieval of features (data from the
delayed-sequential matching task). The crucial finding was that
the rate that feature information was retrieved for the stimuli was
linearly related to the rate that they were perceptually processed,
with feature retrieval taking longer than feature encoding.
Kent and Lamberts (2006a,b) and Lamberts and Kent (2008)
further explored the nature of the relationship between the speed
at which information about features is sampled in perception and
the speed at which information is retrieved about features from
stored memory representations. Utilizing the STR method and
the sequential and simultaneous matching and delayed matching
tasks from Lamberts et al. (2002) but using stimuli built up from
three binary-valued dimensions (similar to Brockdorff and Lam-
berts, 2000). Kent and Lamberts (2006a) were able to estimate the
time course of both perception and retrieval for individual features
of a stimulus. Kent and Lamberts (2006a) demonstrated that the
retrieval rate of features frommemory was affected by whether or
not the interval between the first and second item of the pair was
filled (a simplemath’s equation had to be solved) or unfilled (blank
screen). The retrieval rates in the unfilled task were faster than the
filled task, suggesting the availability of the representation affects
the speed of retrieval (assuming the distracter task in the filled con-
dition weakens the encoded representation, similar to a change
in serial position, e.g., McElree and Dosher, 1989). However,
Kent and Lamberts (2006a) did not find a difference between the
retrieval rates of the different features: all features were retrieved
at the same speed (unlike the perceptual rates, which varied for all
features).
Why did Kent and Lamberts (2006a) not find retrieval rate
differences between the different stored features? One reason,
mentioned previously, relates to the accessibility of the stored
representation, even though a difference was seen between the
filled and unfilled conditions, the accessibility of the representa-
tion might have still been strong enough not to require complete
reconstruction from memory. In order to potentially overcome
this problem, Kent and Lamberts (2006b) used a modified form
of the matching and delayed-matching tasks, which also more
closely equated the demands across tasks. Participantswere trained
to associate each three binary-valued dimensional object with
a unique consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) label. Participants
then carried out four types of task: simultaneous feature-image
matching, in which a single feature was presented in isolation next
to a complete stimulus image; sequential feature-image matching,
simultaneous feature-label matching, in which a single isolated
feature was presented next to a CVC label; and sequential feature-
label matching. Thus the structure of the tasks involving memory
(those involving a CVC label) were identical to the perception
only tasks- participants either had to perceive the image or read
the CVC and then retrieve the stored representation associated
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with that label. Across three experiments Kent and Lamberts
(2006b) demonstrated robust differences in both perception rates
and retrieval rates across the different stimulus features. Generally,
there was also a linear relationship between the speed at which a
feature was perceived and the speed at which it was retrieved,
supporting Lamberts et al. (2002).
However, the tasks used by Kent and Lamberts (2006a) and
Lamberts et al. (2002) differ fundamentally from Kent and Lam-
berts (2006b) in that the latter retrieval tasks can be conceived of as
cued-recall and might not involve identical processes as recogni-
tion (as in the delayed matching tasks). Lamberts and Kent (2008)
therefore reasoned that if the factor driving feature retrieval rate
differences was the strength of the representation inmemory, then
increasing the memory load should weaken the representation, by
increasing demand for resources. To test this idea, Lamberts and
Kent (2008) manipulated load by presenting either a single item
or two items to be remembered in a delayed matching task. This
made it less likely that the information could be held continu-
ously in a rapidly accessible form, and thus increasing the need to
retrieve the representation from a more durable longer-term store
(this conception is consistent with the focus of attention mod-
els of memory by Cowan, 2001; Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002).
The data showed feature retrieval rates varied in the two-item
delayed matching task with a linear relationship between the rate
of feature processing and feature retrieval (supporting Lamberts
et al., 2002, and Kent and Lamberts, 2006b) but no differences in
feature retrieval rates in the one-itemdelayedmatching task (repli-
cating Kent and Lamberts, 2006a). Retrieval demands (based on
the strength of the representation in memory) appear to at least
partially determine whether or not features vary in how quickly
information can be retrieved about them. If the representation
is strong (it is in the current focus of attention) then retrieval is
fast for all features, however, if the representation is weak (not
in the current focus of attention) then retrieval is more effortful
(for example by reconstructing the stimulus back into the focus of
attention).
The ability of a simple stochastic feature sampling process to
predict both perception and retrieval of stimulus feature informa-
tion, and the close relationship between the speed of perception
and retrieval, led Kent and Lamberts (2008) to suggest that the
link between the time course of encoding and the time course of
retrieval arises because, in order for information to be retrieved, a
quasi-perceptual reinstatement of the initial encoding event must
take place (which is not needed if the representation is already
held in the focus of attention). In order to reactivate a stored
representation similar neural pathways are used in a mental simu-
lation of the perception of that stimulus. Although this theoretical
interpretation is not necessary, it links the task of matching and
recognition (and therefore categorization) to a broader cognitive
architecture based onmental simulation (e.g., Barsalou, 2008); we
discuss the importance of this in the Section “Future Directions.”
VISUAL ATTENTION AND SEARCH
Examining perceptual processing using STR procedures has a long
and productive history in visual cognition research (e.g., early
work by Eriksen and Schultz, 1979). For example, STR procedures
have been used to examine the influence of visual attention on
discrimination and the rate of perceptual processing. Although
the influence of visual attention on discrimination has been estab-
lished for some time (e.g., Posner, 1980; see Carrasco, 2011, for
a recent review) in order to disentangle the effect of attention
on discrimination and on processing speed an STR procedure
is required. Using this procedure Carrasco and McElree (2001)
showed that cueing a target location accelerates the rate of visual
information processing (see also Liu et al., 2009). This benefit
of attention is observed using exogenous and endogenous cues,
although cue validity modulates this benefit for endogenous cues
only (Giordano et al., 2009). More recently, the STR approach has
also been used to demonstrate that temporal preparation results
in an earlier onset of visual processing (Bausenhart et al., 2010).
Unpublished work from our laboratory has demonstrated that, in
perceptual categorization, visual attention can modulate feature
processing rates independently of perceptual salience (Lamberts
and Kent, 2006, unpublished manuscript) or feature diagnosticity
(Guest and Lamberts, 2008). Thus STR work on visual attention
exemplifies the usefulness of the basic approach.
One of the central fields of visual cognition research in which
information accumulation models have been used is that of visual
search. Historically, an issueof conjecture in visual search is thedif-
ference between feature search (search for a target that has a unique
value on one of its features such as a blue T amongst yellow Ls and
Ts) and conjunction search (search for a target uniquely defined
by a conjunction of features, such as a blue T amongst blue Ls and
yellow Ts). Some models of search have argued that different pro-
cesses are involved in these search tasks (e.g., Treisman andGelade,
1980; Wolfe, 1994): feature search is pre-attentive because the tar-
get “pops” out of the display due to its unique feature whereas
in conjunction search the target has no unique feature and so
search involves serial shifting of attention from item to item. Oth-
ers have suggested that both feature and conjunction search can be
explained by a limited capacity parallel process. In this context, a
number of studies have examined whether adding additional dis-
tractors to a search task influences the rate of processing in feature
and conjunction search tasks through the use of STR methods.
McElree and Carrasco (1999; Carrasco and McElree, 2001; Car-
rasco et al., 2006) showed that increasing set size decreased visual
information processing rates in conjunction search but not feature
search. Although at face value this appears to support the notion
of different processing mechanisms underlying feature and con-
junction search, fitting information accumulation models to the
time course data, which assumed either parallel or serial sampling,
indicated that performance in both feature and conjunction search
could best be explained by a limited capacity parallel process (see
alsoDosher et al., 2004, 2010). Indeed, a reanalysis of Carrasco and
McElree (2001) data, alongside further experimentation, showed
that increasing display size from one item to more than one item
does influence processing rates in feature search, suggesting visual
information processing is still capacity limited in feature search
(Kent et al., 2012). Kent et al. (2012) also demonstrated that infor-
mation processing rates were affected by the stimulus duration,
with a longer duration speeding processing rates when distractors
were present, but not when distractors were absent. Kent et al.
(2012) interpreted this as indicating that at shorter durations the
stimulus representation fromwhich discrimination took place was
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noisier than when stimulus exposure duration was longer (see also
Liu et al., 2009; Smith and Sewell, 2013 for a similar argument).
Building on this previous work which examined the rate at
which search displays were processed (e.g., Carrasco and McElree,
2001), Guest and Lamberts (2011) developed a model of visual
search based on the principles of the EGCM (the EGCM-VS) that
specifies the processing of component features of individual dis-
play items. The EGCM-VS assumes that information about each
item and about each item’s features is processed independently
and in parallel. Each item’s representation is then compared to
the representation of the target in memory. The probability of a
target present response is based on the combined overall similarity
of display items to the target and the bias toward making a tar-
get absent response. The EGCM-VS is unique in that it explicitly
claims that similarity relationships in a display are dynamic and
change over time as perceptual information is accumulated about
stimulus features. Thus the salience of the features that make up
the display items is crucial in explaining how visual search per-
formance changes over time. As with perceptual categorization,
this dynamic similarity perspective enables the model to account
for non-monotonic changes in response accuracy with increasing
display duration, which models that assume static time invari-
ant similarity have difficulty dealing with. Guest and Lamberts
(2011) showed that the model could account for the time course
of performance in a wide variety of search tasks including fea-
ture search, conjunction search, triple conjunction search and
search displays with different ratios of homogeneous distractors.
Moreover, by modeling perceptual processing of object features
the EGCM-VS enables examination of how feature processing
is influenced by characteristics of the display such as distrac-
tor homogeneity, which appears to accelerate the rate of feature
processing. Of course, other models of visual search such as
guided search (Wolfe, 1994), signal detection models (e.g., Eck-
stein, 1998; Palmer et al., 2000), optimal models (Ma et al., 2011)
and models related to the theory of visual attention (Bundesen,
1990; Logan, 2002), could feasibly integrate a formal mecha-
nism for describing the accumulation of feature information and
this is a challenge for future research. One promising model
of visual attention developed by Ratcliff and Smith (2009) and
applied to multi-element displays by Smith and Sewell (2013)
includes a detailed description of how sensory information is
transferred into VSTM. The process of building a representa-
tion in VSTM includes the accumulation of information from
a sensory trace (similar to Busey and Loftus, 1994) which then
feeds a diffusion process for response generation. Although it is
conceivable that the construction of the VSTM trace is associ-
ated with different information accumulation rates (by allowing
the attention gain function to vary not only due to whether an
item is attended or not, but by the different features of each
item), it is not clear currently how the model could be adapted
to account for tasks in which the different features of a stimulus
are more or less relevant, without a fundamental change to the
core assumptions.
WORD IDENTIFICATION
One form of stimulus that is clearly built up of constituent fea-
tures is the written word. Each individual letter can be considered
a feature of the word just as each letter itself has features (e.g.,
Bower, 1967). Whilst some of the early research on information
accumulation was based on letter string stimuli (e.g., Rumelhart,
1970), interest in this approach to word-like stimuli dwindled
in favor of approaches that implied a static similarity structure
among stimuli, that is, similarity between stimuli did not change
as a function of processing time. The most notable of these was
the Interactive Activation approach (McClelland and Rumelhart,
1981; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1982).
The Interactive Activation framework involves the calculation
of a balance of facilitatorymatching information and inhibitory or
discriminatory mismatching information for any given node (fea-
ture detector); node activation is driven by this net input to an ideal
value; these net inputs operate as unnormalized similarity scores
that ramp up proportionally with input strength, leaving normal-
ized similarity unchanged over time. Evenwith the introduction of
noise (McClelland, 1991), changes in activity represent a smooth
and relentless march toward the correct option. Contemporary
competitor models included some that were even more explicitly
based on static similarity calculations, using transformations of
confusion probabilities to calculate activation (Paap et al., 1982).
Alongside the focus in other areas on integrating feature sam-
pling into models of cognition (e.g., Lamberts, 2000), two types of
challenge to the manner in which these word recognition models
worked set the stage for the recent re-introduction of the idea of
information accumulation to visual word recognition: renewed
arguments for left to right processing of letters, and evidence
relating to the way in which anagrams of words (“wrods”) are
perceived.
It is obvious that in written languages that transcribe spo-
ken language from left to right, reading proceeds word by word
in a broadly left-to-right sequence. Moreover, within a word,
graphemes transcribe from left to right phonemes that are said
in temporal sequence, and recognition of spoken words indeed
proceeds on an initial (incomplete) stimulus (Marslen-Wilson,
1984). It therefore seems natural that letters might be accumu-
lated in visual word perception in a strictly left to right sequence.
Among the evidence that spoken word recognition works on an
initial portion of the stimulus are uniqueness point effects: advan-
tages in the recognition of words whose identity can be inferred
from a few initial phonemes due to the lack of competitors.
Kwantes and Mewhort (1999) and Lindell et al. (2003) ran anal-
ogous studies comparing words for which the left-most three or
four letters uniquely identified the word (e.g., ACTRESS) with
those for which more letters from the left, six or seven (e.g.,
ABSOLVE) would be required. Indeed, the former items were
named and given lexical decisions more rapidly, which would
be expected if letter processing proceeded left to right, and lex-
ical access could begin once a unique word was isolated by the
available letters. However, Lamberts (2005) showed that these
items also differed in confusability without special considera-
tion to left to right processing. Simulations in which the letters
were processed in random order, and lexical access began once
a unique word was isolated by the available letters predicted the
same effect.
Nevertheless, theorists such as Whitney (2001) have pointed
to other phenomena as indicating a left-to-right process, such
www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 412 | 9
Kent et al. Stochastic information accumulation
as a left-to-right gradient in accuracy of identification of letters
in briefly presented strings. Indeed, Whitney has claimed that a
reliable temporal lag (on the order of 10 ms or greater) between
letters in left-to-right sequence is critical to the correct identi-
fication of letter order, which is a major contemporary issue in
visual word recognition (Grainger, 2008). Adelman et al. (2010)
examined whether this was the case by manipulating the duration
of the stimulus in 6 ms increments in a two-alternative forced
choice task on four-letter words. Whilst differences in accuracy
emerged, this could not be attributed to a lag in processing (and
certainly not one of 10 ms/letter magnitude) because for all let-
ter positions, accuracy was at chance for 18 ms presentation and
above chance for 24 ms presentation. Moreover, performance on
pairs like CART–CAST was worse than those like CART–CAMP,
despite the fourth letter being irrelevant to performance under a
fully left to right account (Adelman, 2011, and unpublished data
fromAdelman et al., 2010). An information accumulation account
like that simulated by Lamberts (2005) of course can account for
these patterns with only the assumption that processing is more
efficient (higher processing speed) for letters to the left.
Indeed, Adelman’s (2011) Letters in Time and Retinotopic
Space (LTRS) model was built on this idea to produce an account
that includes the processing of letter order. A variety of findings
have pointed to the fact that letter position is either not used pre-
cisely in the processing of letter strings (ROGUE and ROUGE are
confusable), which requires that models do not use a simple slot
based system where letters that appear in (for example) second
position are only compared to the second letter of known words.
For the identification of strings, in LTRS, information accumula-
tion accounts for the difficulty of anagrams by assuming that both
letters must be perceived to know their relative order: either “W”
or “A” may be perceived to know SWAN is not STUN, but both
“W” and “A” must be perceived to know SWAN is not SAWN (in
fact in the model it is alternatively possible to perceive that “W” is
adjacent to “S” or “A” to “N,” but this is a slower process).
This implies a non-static similarity process in which stimuli
pass from being matches to known words to being mismatches.
Such a process contrasts with models in which stimuli produce
match scores to known words (e.g., Grainger and van Heuven,
2003; Davis, 2010), or behavior stems from the distance between
words and letter strings in psychological space, with percepts being
noisy samples of locations in that space (Norris and Kinoshita,
2012). This is seen in their explanation of the most commonly
used paradigm, masked form priming, in which a brief (ca.
50 ms) prime (e.g., “wlaker”) precedes a clearly presented tar-
get (e.g., “WALKER”) which requires a response (typically lexical
decision); responses are faster when primes are similar to tar-
gets. In other models, the partial match between prime and
target persists throughout the prime’s presentation, and it thus
evokes an attenuated target-like response. For example, “wlaker”
activates a unit for “WALKER,” but not as much as “walker”
would; or on each (and every) time step, the noisy sample of
“wlaker” will probably have a relatively good likelihood of hav-
ing been produced by a stimulus “WALKER,” at least compared to
control.
The Letters in Time and Retinotopic Space model offers a sim-
ple feature sampling account relying on dynamicmatch-mismatch
similarity. It assumes primes activate targets without attenuation,
but target activation stops increasing (but does persist) once the
prime no longer matches the target; target-like processing of the
prime is truncated not attenuated. For primes with few features
in common with the target, a mismatching feature is usually
perceived early producing little priming; for primes with many
features in common, a mismatching feature comes much later.
When order is involved, more than one feature must be perceived
to produce the mismatch, making anagram primes (if the dis-
tortion is minor, e.g., “wlaker”) particularly effective. Through
re-integrating the notion of stochastic feature sampling into word
identification and word priming research, LTRS demonstrates the
importance of considering how perceptual processing at the level
of visual feature influences word reading.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this review, we have tried to demonstrate why integrating fea-
ture sampling intomodels of cognitive processes is important. Our
central argument is that, in a wealth of cognitive tasks, the time
taken for perceptual processing can be a large proportion of the
time taken to complete these tasks. Moreover, because in every-
day life and in the lab, time for processing can be short, decisions
are often made using only incomplete perceptual and memory
representations. Although seemingly obvious, this point is impor-
tant for several reasons. As noted above, re-evaluating tasks from
a feature-based information accumulation perspective can show
that previous findings, such as in word identification (Adelman,
2011) and recognition (Brockdorff and Lamberts, 2000), may, in
part, be explained through consideration of perceptual processes.
Exploring the time course of performance also reveals patterns of
data, such as non-monotonic changes in response accuracy with
increasing stimulus duration (e.g., Lamberts and Freeman, 1999a;
Brockdorff and Lamberts, 2000; Guest and Lamberts, 2011) that
can be readily explained by feature sampling models, but presents
challenges for models without a feature sampling perceptual pro-
cessing component. Finally, by arguing for the importance of
feature sampling in cognition we hope to highlight the need to
consider the role of perceptual processing in cognitive tasks, even
where the perceptual component may appear relatively minor. A
recent example comes from Inglis and Gilmore (2013) who noted
that in studies of the approximate number system (ANS) estimates
of ANS acuity varied between studies but so did the duration
for which stimuli were presented. Ingles and Gilmore demon-
strated that differences in the acuity of ANS representations with
changes in stimulus duration could be best described by a per-
ceptual processing information accumulation model. We believe
that evaluation of perceptual processing mechanisms is therefore
a useful and important endeavor.
It is now clear that it is important to consider both feature
sampling form the sensory store and representations held in
memory. Kent and Lamberts (2008) have argued that sampling
from the display and sampling from memory involve closely
related and overlapping processes. This observation fits in well
with the notion that cognition is grounded and that the same
perceptual-action systems involved in stimulus encoding are also
partly involved in retrieval (e.g., Barsalou, 2008). Clearly, more
work is needed in developing a detailed computational account
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of grounded cognition (Pezzulo et al., 2013); we suggest that
categorization, identification, and recognition might provide an
excellent test bed as indeed they have in the past (e.g., Nosof-
sky, 1992). However, the link between encoding and retrieval also
raises a number of, as yet unanswered, questions. An important
question is what is the main driver of the time course of perfor-
mance in the tasks we have reviewed? Is it sampling from the
display or is it sampling from memory? We think the answer
will undoubtedly be complex and will depend on a number of
components including: stimulus-driven factors, such as the com-
plexity or number of items in the display, the complexity and
discriminability of object features; process limitations, such as
limited attentional resources; memory factors, such the strength
of representations and the number of relevant comparison items
in memory; and task-based demands, such as the category struc-
ture and the number of response options. As a first step toward
exploring these issues we have begun to formalize the relation-
ship between the perceptual and memory sampling processes in
a forthcoming article (Guest et al., manuscript in preparation).
In our model of absolute identification, memory sampling and
matching begins as soon as a perceptual information element has
been processed. Estimates of the length of the different sam-
pling processes can be estimated, in this task yielding a short
perceptual sampling process followed by a longer memory sam-
pling process. Importantly, in this task the perceptual component
is simple (involving a single dimension) and the memory com-
ponent more complex (comparison of the stimulus to multiple,
highly confusable, stored representations). In comparison, in
visual search, there aremany display items that need to be encoded
and compared with a single stored representation (the target).
Such key differences might well modulate the relative roles of the
perceptual and memory sampling processes in determining task
performance.
Whereas models based around the simple processing assump-
tions of the EGCM have had some success, it is clear that the
model itself is simplistic and will need fleshing out before it can be
considered a complete process model of perceptual cognition. An
alternative approach is to take existing successfulmodels of percep-
tual decision making and augment them with a stochastic feature
sampling mechanism (e.g., Lamberts, 2002). For instance, Bieder-
man et al. (1999) cite the evidence of Lamberts (1998) as support
for their theoretical assumption of featural representations (Hum-
mel and Biederman, 1992). Indeed, many of the most compelling
paradoxes of decision making come from multiattribute choice
(e.g., Tversky, 1972); the stochastic nature of feature processing
for the different attributes might be important in generating the
pardoxes. Already many recent models include processes of infor-
mation accumulation (e.g., see Logan, 2004; Ratcliff and Smith,
2004, 2009; Purcell et al., 2010; Smith and Sewell, 2013). However,
it is non-trivial to integrate separable feature stimuli into these
models; it is, nonetheless, an important and worthwhile endeavor
for future research.
It is also important to integrate the reviewed mechanisms for
feature and memory sampling into a neurobiological framework.
In categorization, the COVIS model developed by Ashby et al.
(1998, 2011) is a good example of this approach. In COVIS,
category learning involves multiple systems that are localized in
different brain regions (Ashby et al., 2003; Filoteo et al., 2005;
Maddox and Filoteo, 2005) with an implicit procedural-based
system that mediates category learning when it is necessary to
integrate information from multiple dimensions and an explicit
hypothesis-testing system thatmediates rule-based category learn-
ing. Although offering a potential framework within which
to explore perceptual processing mechanisms in categorization,
the notion of multiple systems has been repeatedly questioned
(Gureckis et al., 2011; Newell et al., 2011; Dunn et al., 2012).
In terms of the biological basis for feature and memory sam-
pling, evidence from studies with monkeys (for a review see Gold
and Shadlen, 2007) and humans (for a review see Heekeren et al.,
2008) suggests multiple neural systems mediating human percep-
tual decision making. Heekeren et al. (2008) suggest four distinct
systems. In the first, lower level sensory regions are involved in
accumulation of sensory evidence, the exact region depending on
the task (e.g., the fusiform face area and theparahippocampal place
area in a face-house discrimination task). At higher levels, such as
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, this sensory evidence is inte-
grated and compared in order to compute a decision, with activity
in such areas being likened to a diffusion process (Schall, 2001;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007) It seems probable then that feature and
memory sampling aremediated by these two systems, respectively.
A further system, involving areas such as the anterior insula and
the inferior frontal gyrus, is thought to detect perceptual difficulty
and signal whenmore resources are required (e.g., attention). Such
a system could well be involved in determining the extent of fea-
ture and memory sampling required. This will also depend on the
speed-accuracy tradeoff, which seems to be modulated by the pre-
supplementary motor area (Bogacz et al., 2010). A final system
involving areas such as the posterior medial prefrontal cortex is
thought to monitor performance and adjust decision strategies to
maximize performance. This system may determine trial to trial
differences in the processing and utilization of feature informa-
tion. Substantial progress has therefore been made in determining
the neural systems mediating perceptual decision making, and
relations between these systems and components of the feature
sampling account are apparent. An important avenue for future
research is to explore the evidence for such links and work toward
development of a computational cognitive neuroscience approach
in this area.
Individual and group differences are also an increasingly
important aspect to be considered in basic cognitive research (e.g.,
Kanai and Rees, 2011). It is clear people have different SAT curves,
and it is also likely that people will vary in the relative rate at which
they complete cognitive tasks, including simple feature percep-
tion (e.g., Salthouse, 1996). As an illustrative example, Guest et al.
(manuscript in preparation) recently conducted a series of exper-
iments which showed age related slowing in visual information
processing speed for tasks requiring visual search and processing
and maintenance of multiple items in visual working memory.
Moreover, comparison of processing rates between tasks indicated
that maintaining multiple item representations led to a more age
related decline visual information processing rates than a search
task in which multiple distractors were dismissed online. Thus,
understanding how the temporal dynamics of cognition changes
across the lifespan and varies between individuals could provide a
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rich vein of data about individual differences in cognition. Such
research should investigate these differences within the context
of formal models in order to better understand the processes
underlying individual differences.
Although we make the case for considering the role of percep-
tual processes in cognitive tasks, we appreciate that this is not
without additional complications. Typically, in order to study
the time course of information accumulation, a STR procedure
is required, which: increases the number of required trials (often
by a factor of at least 5–7, and hence the duration and cost of
an experiment by the same factor); introduces additional cog-
nitive load into the task which participants find unnatural to
complete; requires extensive training, potentially altering the sam-
ple of participants who can complete the task and the strategies
they use (having already had extensive experience on the task);
and the loss of many data points. Although these issues should
not preclude the use of STR designs, and measures can be taken
to mitigate their impact, these are clearly a disincentive for using
such designs. Recently, Kent et al. (2014) presented data on the use
of mouse tracking as an alternative to the STR procedure (see also
Spivey et al., 2005; Dale et al., 2007; Freeman, 2014). Mouse track-
ing (recording the X and Y position over time toward response
options), or indeed other forms of dynamic responding (e.g.,
reaching movements, Song and Nakayama, 2009), provides an
advantage in that the response is natural, not time restricted, and
involves little or no practice. By requiring participants to attempt
to start making their response immediately after stimulus onset,
we argue it is possible to measure early choice preferences before
a complete stimulus representation has been formed. Clearly fur-
ther work needs to be undertaken before the relationship between
STR data and dynamic response tracking data is fully appreci-
ated (e.g., Friedman et al., 2013), but for now we note that we
have replicated both the early category cross over effects reported
by Lamberts (1995; Lamberts and Brockdorff, 1997; Lamberts
and Freeman, 1999a; Guest and Lamberts, 2011) and the rate dif-
ferences in discrimination experiments (Carrasco and McElree,
2001). It is hoped that dynamic response techniques may make it
much easier to elucidate the perceptual mechanisms in cognitive
tasks, enabling greater focus on how the time course of percep-
tual processing influences performance in a much broader range
of cognitive tasks. Work in other others is also set to benefit from
these insights, for example, Freeman (2014; see also Freeman and
Ambady,2011; Freeman et al., 2011) has attempted to demonstrate
early implicit attitudes (such as gender stereotypes) at least partly
reflect the early dominance of more salient dimensions of faces
(e.g., hair length).
The idea that information is accumulated gradually, feature-
by-feature, from a stimulus has a long history, and it is clear from
recent developments in a number of core cognitive areas, andmore
recently social cognition, that the need to understand this process
and incorporate it in models of both perception and memory is
important to understanding how people make decisions based on
partially constructed stimulus representations.
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